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Not all Humans: Radical Criticism of the 
Anthropocene Narrative
Hasana Sharp
Abstract: Earth scientists have declared that we are living in “the Anthropo-
cene,” but radical critics object to the implicit attribution of responsibility 
for climate disruption to all of humanity. They are right to object. Yet, in 
effort to implicate their preferred villains, their revised narratives often paint 
an overly narrow picture. Sharing the impulse of radical critics to tell a more 
precise and political story about how we arrived where we are today, this 
paper wagers that collective action is more effectively mobilized when we 
identify multiple agencies and diverse historical processes as sites in need 
of urgent intervention.
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Following a proposal by Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer, earth scientists have come to refer informally to our geo-historical situation as the “Anthro-
pocene,”1 the time of the human. A recent comprehensive review of the data 
concludes that “Human activity is now global and is the dominant cause of 
most contemporary environmental change. The impacts of human activity will 
probably be observable in the geological stratigraphic record for millions of 
years into the future, which suggests that a new epoch has begun.”2 A planet 
of 4.5 billion years has seen many epochs, but at some point human activity 
1. Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer, “The Anthropocene,” IGBP [International Geo-
sphere-Biosphere Programme] Newsletter 41 (2000): 14–18.
2. Simon L. Lewis and Mark A. Maslin, “Defining the Anthropocene,” Nature 519 (2015): 
171.
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became so disruptive that it will likely be credited with ushering in “the sixth 
extinction,” a devastating loss of life and biodiversity that very well may imply 
the eventual end of human beings ourselves.3 Earth scientists are actively de-
bating the precise dating of the not yet formalized Anthropocene epoch, fully 
aware that the date will have immense implications for social policy, including 
how to pay the costs of what is rather delicately called “climate adaptation.” 
Lewis and Maslin observe,
defining an early start date may, in political terms, ‘normalize’ global envi-
ronmental change. Meanwhile, agreeing [to] a later start date related to the 
Industrial Revolution may, for example, be used to assign historical responsi-
bility for carbon dioxide emissions to particular countries or regions during 
the industrial era.4
The project of determining the name and date for our novel geohistorical situ-
ation is evidently moral and political. The name means to sound the alarm of 
increasing ecological precarity, but it also points to the question of “historical 
responsibility.” Such responsibility will likely include some financial obligation 
to address past, present, and future devastation, although wealthy nations have 
so far strongly resisted any formal accounting system for environmental de-
struction.5
Many radical critics have resisted the proposed appellation of “the Anthro-
pocene.” Whereas natural scientists call attention to the problems humanity 
poses to planetary atmospheric, chemical, and biotic systems, radical theorists 
overwhelmingly object to the biological idiom of species. The “Anthropocene” 
expresses a sudden disregard for the important distinctions among us, the un-
derstanding and critique of which is the object of much work in the social 
sciences and humanities.6 What about differences in power that are system-
atically instituted along the lines of nation, class, race, sex, and ability? What 
about the dramatic disparities in causal responsibility for the advent of climate 
disruption? As Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz put it in their 
impressive overview of Anthropocene discourses, “Should the Yanomami In-
dians who hunt, fish, and garden in the Amazonian forest, working three hours 
a day with no fossil fuel [ . . . ] feel responsible for the climate change of the An-
3. See Elizabeth Kolbert, The Sixth Extinction (New York: Henry and Holt, 2014).
4. Lewis and Maslin, “Defining the Anthropocene,” 171.
5. See Neil Adger, Jouni Paavola, Saleemul Huq, and M. J. Mace, eds. Fairness in Adapta-
tion to Climate Change (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006).
6. For example, Andreas Malm and Alf Hornborg, “The Geology of Mankind? A Critique 
of the Anthropocene Narrative” The Anthropocene Review 1 (2014): 62–69.
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thropocene?”7 Several alternative names have been proposed in order to better 
target the forces responsible for this epochal shift, including “Capitalocene,”8 
“Eurocene,”9 and “Oliganthropocene.”10 When earth scientists increasingly 
agree that “man,” humanity, or Anthropos, is the problem for life on this planet, 
radical critics frequently retort “not all humans.”
Such critics are undoubtedly correct in this assertion. Anthropos as such 
is not a unitary super-agent that has precipitated grave ecological destruc-
tion. The problem is not the inevitable unfolding of species development, but 
is “sociogenic.”11 Radical challenges concerned to understand more precisely 
the mechanisms and agencies that have precipitated climate change and mass 
extinction are important and necessary. Effective responses to our predicament 
demand richer analyses of the complex network of causes that have produced 
and continue to sustain ecological precarity.
Nevertheless, I want to offer an immanent critique of the radical responses 
to the Anthropocene narrative. Although I hope to encourage and contribute 
to radical ecological politics today, there is a feature of the discourse that I find 
to be strategically and normatively limiting: the impulse to conflate the tracing 
of causality with the identification and, most importantly, the isolation of those 
morally responsible. This impulse is not equally prominent in the different crit-
ics I will discuss, but is present to some degree in all. It betrays itself in the 
tendency to point to a particular “clique,”12 or to those who “knowingly” and 
willfully advocate and exploit ecologically destructive policies.13 Many radical 
thinkers worry that the Anthropocene thesis implicates everyone equally, in-
cluding those who have contributed the least but are poised to suffer the most 
from environmental destruction. These protests on behalf of the innocent cast 
the debate as a contest over moral culpability, and lead, naturally enough, to 
7. Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene (Lon-
don: Verso, 2015), 70.
8. See, Jason Moore, Capitalism in the Web of Life (London: Verso, 2015).
9. Gilbert Caluya, “Fragments for a Post-Colonial Critique of the Anthropocene,” in Re-
thinking Invasion Ecologies from the Environmental Humanities, edited by J. Frawley and I 
MaCalman (London: Routledge, 2014).
10. This is Eric Swyngedouw’s term to indicate “an epoch of a few men and even fewer 
women,” cited in Bonneuil and Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene, 71.
11. Malm and Hornborg, “The Geology of Mankind,” 66.
12. Malm and Hornborg, “The Geology of Mankind,” 64.
13. This is the emphasis of Bonneuil and Fressoz who insist that “we must understand how 
we entered the Anthropocene despite very consistent warnings, knowledge, and opposition” 
(The Shock of the Anthropocene, 79). 
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identifying preferred villains. Radical thinkers have contributed invaluable 
analyses to the problem of climate change, but the flashes of moral indigna-
tion risk isolating the forces of harm to captains of industry, oil tycoons, and 
members of the ruling class. The Anthropocene thesis must be refined. It is 
false and politically unhelpful to declare that the human species is the unitary 
cause of climate disruption. However, if the goal of radical criticism is to po-
liticize the Anthropocene narrative, then we must be wary both of moralizing 
it and of reducing the causal analysis to one set of actors or a single nefari-
ous process. Deconstructing the Anthropocene narrative entails discovering 
the unevenness and dispersion of the causal processes as well as examining 
our geohistorical situation’s overdetermination and the non-linear processes 
through which we have arrived where we are today. Given the complex and 
dispersed character of ecological devastation, our analysis and politics should 
likewise enable diverse sites of intervention.
#NOTALLANTHROPOI
The adoption by earth scientists of the informal name “Anthropocene” opens a 
dialogue among natural scientists, humanists, and social scientists. For those of 
us outside the natural sciences, the naming of the Anthropocene both disturbs 
and confirms operating assumptions in our disciplines. On the one hand, it val-
idates—for better and for worse—special attention to humanity as a uniquely 
important subject, essential not only to our own self-understanding but to the 
evolution of our planet’s systems and the millions of other species that depend 
on them. On the other hand, it exhorts us to pay much more precise attention 
to how we affect other species, nonhuman phenomena, and complex planetary 
systems. We do no act in a uniquely human realm, affected only by moral laws. 
Rather, we obey but also mutate natural laws, global rhythms, and relationship 
patterns among organic and inorganic matter. Our story is undeniably no lon-
ger (if it ever was) our own. But for those of us working in traditions of radical 
or critical theory, our task has been to complicate invocations of a universal 
“we,” appeals to humanity as a unified whole. Therefore, the Anthropocene 
sounds to many feminist, Marxist, postcolonial, and antiracist critics like a step 
backwards.
When I refer to radical critics, I mean those theorists who maintain the 
need for comprehensive social and political change. They insist that justice 
cannot be achieved while the dominant social structures remain intact. For 
Marxist critics of climate change, for example, it is not possible to address cli-
mate change without fighting the dominant mode of production: capitalism. 
This is a wide umbrella, but it excludes those theorists of climate justice who, 
for instance, propose ameliorating ecological harm through purchasing carbon 
Not all Humans:  Radical Criticism of the Anthropocene Narrative 5
offsets, corporate taxes, and international agreements alone.14 Radical accounts 
do not yield counsel for policy reform or adaptation through individual moral 
restraint and expert-guided technological innovation. Rather, they call for 
comprehensive, collective, global change. They exhort us, in our efforts to stem 
the tide of ecological devastation, to fight capitalism, colonialism, militarism, 
and/or species supremacy. In their ambition for comprehensive social trans-
formation, radical critics call attention to how the social structures that have 
given rise to ecological precarity have long thrived on producing precarious 
life for humans and nonhumans alike. Business as usual, even if much more 
tightly regulated, is still a business of domination, exploitation, and violence 
against the many (humans and nonhumans). For critics whose work is defined 
by identifying radical differences in power, the social structures that support 
and perpetuate them, and articulating the desire and means for radical trans-
formation, the Anthropocene sounds like a return to an uncritical universal 
invocation of undifferentiated humanity.
One of the first problems is that the term Anthropocene seems to confirm 
rather than to challenge both anthropocentrism and speciesism.15 A frequent 
refrain in the Anthropocene literature is that the human species has become 
an “overwhelming” geological force, an awesome and unprecedented power, 
dwarfing that of any other species in the planet’s 4.5 billion year history.16 Eileen 
Crist claims that, even if the name aims to call attention to the deadly disrup-
tion of the conditions of life as we know it on the planet, the discourse does 
nothing to challenge the notion of human supremacy and specialness: “Cold 
and broken though it be, it’s still a Hallelujah.”17 Even if it signals the decline of 
Human Empire, the Anthropocene remains a story about human hegemony.18 
Much Anthropocene discourse suggests plainly that we made earthly reality 
what it is and it is our duty to return it to a state that is habitable for humans. 
14. For example, John Broome, Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World (New York: 
Norton, 2012).
15. Claire Colebrook argues that the Anthropocene confirms human exceptionalism, if not 
anthropocentrism. See her Death of the Posthuman, vol. 1 (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Human-
ities Press, 2014).
16. Will Steffen, Paul J. Crutzen, and John R. McNeil, “The Anthropocene: Are Humans 
Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature?” Ambio 36.8 (2007): 614–621.
17. Eileen Crist, “On the Poverty of our Nomenclature,” in Anthropocene or Capitalocene? 
Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism, edited by J. Moore (Oakland, CA: The PM 
Press, 2016), 17.
18. Speciesism expresses a view that the world, including the totality of nonhuman animals, 
exists for us. Rights, morality, and community are goods that humans alone enjoy, and we 
are justified in instrumentalizing any and all of life for human well-being.
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The discourse, especially in its popular incarnations, expresses the fantasy that 
whether and how we “fix” this is purely a matter of human will. There is little 
humility about what we might be able to achieve, little concern for what the 
Anthropocene implies for nonhuman animals, and little critical reflection on 
the fact that to “fix” the world is only to secure our survival.19 “Nothing about 
it—much less the name—offers an alternative to the civilizational revamping 
of Earth as a base of human operations and functional stage for history’s unin-
terrupted performance.”20
Crist argues that the name “Anthropocene” is continuous with the enter-
prise of human expansionism, falsely and dangerously representing human 
supremacy as an incontestable and uncontested historical fact. Among the 
many problems with the narrative of a progressive and ultimately tragic human 
imperialism is the failure to describe how human takeover is “an unexamined 
choice” that can, according to Crist, be replaced (or at least resisted) by en-
lightened ecocentric aspiration.21 Although Crist points several times to the 
disregard for intrahuman differentiation, criticizing the anointing of “a homog-
enized protagonist,” her primary ambition is to chasten the fantasy of human 
supremacy. She thereby highlights the continuity between Anthropocene dis-
course and a long history of speciesist disregard for nonhuman life (a category, 
we might add, that also subsumed most humans). For Crist, the Anthropocene 
expresses a philosophical anthropology of human supremacy that must be 
comprehensively overturned. The problem is not only that ecological devas-
tation is the consequence of some humans but that those humans justify their 
activity with a pernicious and speciesist conception of human progress and 
supremacy. “When all is said and done, it is with an entire anthropology that 
we are at war. With the very idea of man.”22
If most radical critics share a suspicion of a humanist anthropology that 
treats Man as the agent of climate change and ecological destruction, they 
do not necessarily agree about which men are the problem. Andreas Malm 
and Alf Hornborg, accordingly, insist that the problem is not and has never 
been humankind as an undifferentiated whole. Neither is the problem, as deep 
ecologists might argue, anthropocentrism or species supremacy as a corrupt 
psycho-spiritual orientation toward nonhuman nature. The problem is the 
19. See, for example, Gaia Vince, Adventures in the Anthropocene: A Journey to the Heart of 
the Planet We Made (London: Chatto and Windus, 2014).
20. Crist, “On the Poverty of our Nomenclature,” 24.
21. Crist, “On the Poverty of our Nomenclature,” 25.
22. This is Crist’s wonderful epigraph borrowed from The Invisible Committee, The Coming 
Insurrection (MIT Press, 2007).
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devastating effects of the fossil fuel economy and the culture and power that it 
involves. They make the simple but profound point that “the origins of anthro-
pogenic climate change were predicated on highly inequitable global processes 
from the start.”23 Responsibility for climate devastation lies, they insist, with a 
statistically very small slice of humanity.
A tiny minority even in Britain, this class of people comprised an infinitesimal 
fraction of the population of Homo sapiens in the early nineteenth century. 
Indeed, a clique of white British men literally pointed steam-power as a 
weapon—on sea and land, boats and rails—against the best part of human-
kind, from the Niger delta to the Yangzi delta, the Levant to Latin America.24
Malm and Hornborg call attention especially to capitalism’s essential role in 
precipitating the conditions of the Anthropocene, and do not shrink from 
finger-pointing rhetoric. They call attention to how a tiny “clique” produced 
“the great acceleration” of carbon emissions, ocean acidification, and defor-
estation, among other drivers of climate change. Certainly, it is a premise of 
Marxism that world capitalism is not accidentally but essentially predicated on 
the power of the few over the many. This means that the “affluence of high-tech 
modernity cannot possibly be universalized—become an asset of the species—
because it is predicated on a global division of labour that is geared precisely to 
abysmal price and wage differences between populations.”25 But does it follow 
that criticism is, first of all, a matter of who is to blame? Is the task to identify 
the “clique” of weapon-pointing villains? Did the worst part of humanity attack 
“the best part”?
Malm and Hornborg object to the Anthropocene discourse because it treats 
climate change as a natural inevitability rather than a “sociogenic” reality.26 
They advocate a more precise causal understanding in the development of the 
fossil economy both for the sake of accuracy and to promote its dismantling. 
Rather than describing our history of ecological devastation as a lamentable ef-
fect of human nature, it ought to be grasped as a contestable—and, historically, 
vigorously contested—imposition of the ruling class. I am not in a position, as 
a philosopher, to quarrel with their descriptive claims. I also endorse the con-
clusion that fighting climate change requires strenuous anti-capitalist struggle. 
Nevertheless, in advocating a more precise causal history that preserves the 
23. Malm and Hornborg, “The Geology of Mankind,” 63. 
24. Malm and Hornborg, “The Geology of Mankind,” 64.
25. Malm and Hornborg, “The Geology of Mankind,” 64.
26. Malm and Hornborg, “The Geology of Mankind,” 66. They appear to take credit for the 
neologism of “sociogenic,” but I associate “sociogeny” with Frantz Fanon. See Black Skin, 
White Masks. 
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tools of social science, their case reads more like a prosecutor’s brief. It exposes 
and vilifies the “clique of white British men.” It insists that significant portions 
of the population ought to be excluded in “allocations of responsibility.”27
Gilbert Caluya, from a post-colonial perspective, also recoils from the dec-
laration of the arrival of the Anthropocene.
I am suspicious when just as the category of the human is reluctantly opening 
to incorporate non-normative genders, sexualities, and racialized (and less 
successfully differently-abled) people, the human is once again returned to a 
universal category under the rubric of climate change, global warming, and/ 
or the Anthropocene.28
Like Crist, Malm, and Hornborg, Caulya sees the new legitimacy accorded to 
discussion of humanity as a whole to be a loss for radical political thought. 
Indeed, as soon as the discourse of Enlightenment humanity has been chas-
tened as a provincial concept, exposed as a tool of domination, and forced to 
acknowledge its failure to secure its promise of universal freedom, Anthropos 
appears as the agent of an even grander planetary history.
In a similar vein to Malm and Hornborg, Caluya suggests that, if we were 
to accept the dating of the Anthropocene from the Industrial Revolution, “a 
fairer and more precise term would be Eurocene, or Anglocene.”29 For reasons 
with which I sympathize, Caluya finds that the language of the Anthropocene 
is unfair. It distributes responsibility for climate change, mass extinction, ocean 
acidification, and other grave ecological harms to all humans. Such dramatic 
planetary changes have not been caused by all humans and neither have all 
humans benefitted from the technological innovation of the Industrial Revo-
lution. Indeed, Indigenous communities in the Arctic, on small islands, or in 
Amazonian forests have contributed nothing to climate change or to the mass 
destruction of biodiversity, yet they are suffering perhaps the gravest losses as 
a result. Nevertheless, we might ask, what is missed when we grasp the harms 
of our age as radiating from England and the steaming weapons a few white 
British men? Do we get a better explanation? Do we get the promise of com-
prehensive transformation?
I see at least two problems with location of historical responsibility with 
one nation and one small group within that nation. First, it personalizes and 
thereby moralizes the critique. Second, it lends itself better to a movement to 
27. Malm and Hornborg, “The Geology of Mankind,” 65.
28. Caluya, “Fragments for a Post-Colonial Critique,” 34.
29. Caluya, “Fragments for a Post-Colonial Critique,” 35.
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hold some bodies liable rather than to a mass movement to solve our collective 
problems. I will address each of these briefly.
Malm, Hornborg, and Caluya are all informed by Marxism. Such an ap-
proach to making sense of ecological destruction is, to my mind, especially 
promising. The capitalist imperative for endless growth and accumulation is 
arguably the greatest obstacle to slowing down climate change and mass ex-
tinction. But we ought to preserve in mind Marx’s insistence that his theory 
was not about laying blame upon individual capitalists, who, for him, were far 
from masters of their actions. For Marx, capitalist exploitation is a product 
of impersonal forces over which individuals have minimal control.30 As Marx 
writes,
I do not by any means depict the capitalist and landowner in rosy colors. 
But individuals are dealt with here only insofar as they are personifications 
of economic categories, the bearers of particular class-relations and interests. 
My standpoint, from which the development of the economic formation of 
society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make 
the individual responsible for relations whose creature he remains, socially 
speaking, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.31
To politicize the history of the Anthropocene from a Marxist perspective, then, 
does not mean that we find the fraction of the population of evil-doers. Rather, 
it requires us to identify the system that enables and constrains capitalist rela-
tions of exploitation and domination such that they appear like iron-clad laws 
of nature. Market laws are such that no matter how conscientious and well-in-
tentioned individual capitalists, landlords, or managers are, they cannot see a 
way to survive without respecting the laws of low-wages, low-prices, and max-
imum growth, regardless of the costs to human and nonhuman life.32
While it remains necessary and important to challenge the implication that 
“Humanity” has ushered in climate change, the conclusion that capitalism bears 
a great deal of responsibility should not imply that the source of harm is iso-
lated to the actions of an “infinitesimal” fraction of the population. Capitalism 
would not be the dominant mode of production if it did not recruit the activity 
of millions of us, as consumers, workers, and entrepreneurs. It is not those men 
(or their heirs) that we need to change (I personally don’t have much hope 
for them), but the system that made them. If the question is not comprehen-
30. For a compatible but different critique, see Cunha, “The Geology of the Ruling Class?” 
The Anthropocene Review 2.3 (2015): 262–266.
31. Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, translated by B. Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 1990), 92.
32. From a somewhat different perspective, see Young’s analysis of landlords in Responsibil-
ity for Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), ch. 2.
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sive change but whom to charge for the damages, then such a liability politics 
makes sense. But if we bankrupt some capitalists and their heirs, new ones 
will take their place. My claim is not that reparations are unjustified. Indeed, it 
would be right and good if fossil fuel industries were forced to pay billions to 
Indigenous communities whose sacred land they have destroyed, or to address 
the countless other damages to humans and nonhumans wrought by drilling, 
mining, and deforestation. I am skeptical, however, that radical movements 
should direct a preponderance of our energy at demanding compensation from 
the powerful. In other words, the most effective way to fight Goliath may not 
be to approach him directly, provide evidence of his wrongdoing, and demand 
justice. Not only will rich nations and the most successful industries in human 
history do everything in their power to limit their liability, any resources will 
likely be distributed through top-down networks that preserve the current ar-
rangements of power and radical inequality.33
The rhetoric of the malicious, powerful minority has long been a feature 
of radical discourse. Rhetorically, it aims to reveal the current arrangement 
of power as one that serves the few and harms the many. But it also plays too 
well into an individualizing and moralizing discourse of responsibility, which 
diverts from a systemic and capillary understanding of power and domination. 
It arouses indignation and outrage, but, as Iris Young suggests, it may also de-
liver absolution. I have no doubt that there have been and continue to be evil 
actors who have precipitated grave harm to human and nonhuman life through 
their business practices, extraction techniques, and labor policies. But, with 
Young, I fear that a precise location of responsibility in a single class within a 
single nation undermines rather than encourages the mass solidarity required 
for comprehensive change.34
In the following section, I will consider two other proposals for reconceiv-
ing our geohistorical situation. These proposals also insist that not all humans 
have precipitated increasing ecological precarity, but they do not concentrate 
responsibility narrowly on England. It seems to me that a decentered approach 
has more explanatory value and more political promise. The effects of climate 
change are widely dispersed and so must the response be.35 The agent is not 
one, or an infinitesimal, microscopic few, that we might excise like a tumor that 
33. Many journalists who are far from radical critics point to the very limited efficacy of the 
more promising International climate accords. See, for example, Cassidy, “A Skeptical Note 
on the Paris Climate Deal,” The New Yorker (14 December, 2015). Accessed online, 22 June 
2016. http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/skeptical-note-paris-climate-deal. 
34. See Young, Responsibility for Justice, ch. 4.
35. Bronwyn Hayward, “Let’s Talk About the Weather: Decentering Democratic Debate 
About Climate Change,” Hypatia 23.3 (2008): 79.
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has not yet metastasized. It is to these broader challenges to the Anthropocene 
narrative that I now turn.
THINKING THE ORBIS
Other critics have insisted that not all humans are responsible for ecological 
devastation and precarity but without identifying a narrow range of culprits. 
Many of these arguments have taken place through challenging the chronology 
that privileges the Industrial Revolution as the watershed moment in climate 
history. I do not have the kind of expertise to contribute to arguments about 
dates, but I see advantages to a story that involves a wider range of actors and 
causes. Radical political thought favors systemic and structural analyses of 
formal and informal relationships among groups and institutions, in order to 
understand how power operates in diffuse and capillary ways. We understand 
change not to emanate exclusively from the decisions of officials, heads of State, 
or laws, even if those things have profound material effects on peoples’ lives. In 
a globalized world, we are enabled and constrained by complex transnational 
networks of power. Of course, there are no capitalism or patriarchy headquar-
ters that we can storm to demand justice. So we need to try to understand 
the complex, overdetermined constellation of powers threatening human and 
nonhuman life today.
Jason Moore, in Capitalism and the Web of Life and “The Rise of Cheap 
Nature,” deepens and extends the political history of climate change, mass ex-
tinction, and ocean acidification. Like other radical critics, his very first point 
of intervention is to reject the notion that the agent of ecological devastation is 
the human species. He holds the capitalist mode of production, a way of orga-
nizing human and nonhuman life, responsible for ecological devastation. The 
problem is not a group of people, but a complex web of relationships, defined 
by the organization of all life in the service of surplus value, or the accumu-
lation of profit. He advocates what he calls a “world ecological” analysis that 
situates Europe and capitalism always in relationship to the global pathways of 
conquest, trade, and exploitation. He advocates renaming our geological ep-
och “Capitalocene” to foreground the agency of capitalism in the re-shaping of 
planetary life. Moore’s primary object of criticism is the tendency to identify 
anthropogenic climate change with the Industrial revolution, coal, steam, and 
the fossil fuel economy. This perspective, in his view, inflates and isolates the 
role of energy industries and that of England. With different concerns than 
mine, he rejects the narrative of climate change originating among captains of 
industry.
In Capitalism and the Web of Life, he outlines a history of capitalism from 
the point of view of “the long sixteenth century” (1450–1640). In contrast to 
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narratives that radiate outward from the Industrial Revolution, the world-eco-
logical perspective entails more robust roles played by global conquest, various 
economies of slave labor, the radical landscape transformations involved in 
plantation agriculture and mining, and the imperialist projects of, especially, 
the Spanish and the Dutch. The story ceases to be about a few men from one 
nation involved in energy-intensive industries. It becomes a complex narrative 
with a wider range of actors. Capitalism, from the world-ecological perspec-
tive, is not only the tragic story of English factories, but also of enslavement, 
genocide, and the re-ordering of the planet’s biota. On his account, climate 
change, mass extinction, and ocean acidification cannot be understood with-
out attention to slavery, genocide, mass habitat and species extinctions, or the 
putting to work of human and nonhuman nature for capital.36
Moore seeks a radical new ontology that can better appreciate how capi-
talism is not opposed to nature, but is a way that nature works. Aligned with 
ecofeminist criticism, he insists throughout that most humans are dominated 
through being treated as parts of nature, as extractable resources to benefit a 
version of “human progress” that excludes them. At the same time, he insists 
that we need more valid ways of grasping how we are involved ineluctably in 
a web of life that we cannot control or manipulate, as if we were external to 
it. His world-ecological story, therefore, better appreciates how nonhumans 
are exploited and annihilated in what is often narrowly understood as “social 
struggle,” as if only humans were involved or affected by the rule of capital.37
Moore thus attacks the human-nature binary, and provides a distinctive 
historical account of its functioning. He depends on Val Plumwood’s ecofemi-
nist critique of Cartesian dualism as the conceptual and practical subordination 
of the material to the spiritual, the corporeal to the mental,38 to which he adds 
abundant historical detail and a critique of political economy. Moore argues 
that Cartesian dualism reflects not only the domination of women and nonhu-
man nature, but the specifically capitalist organization of the web of life.
That boundary—the Nature/Society divide that the Anthropocene affirms 
and that many of us now question—was fundamental to the rise of capitalism. 
36. For an accessible overview of his position, see Moore, “The Rise of Cheap Nature,” in 
Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism, edited by J. 
Moore (Oakland, CA: The PM Press, 2016). 
37. Justin McBrien goes further than Moore to emphasize the costs to nonhuman life in 
his cry against what he aptly calls “The Necrocene.” See “Accumulating Extinction,” in An-
thropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism, edited by J. Moore 
(Oakland, CA: The PM Press, 2016).
38. Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge, 1993).
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For it allowed nature to become Nature—environments without Humans. But 
what about the upper case H?: Nature was full of humans treated as Nature.39
Indeed, “the realm of Nature—as ontological formation and world praxis—en-
compassed virtually all people of color, most women, and most people with 
white skin living in semicolonial regions.”40
Moore seems to accomplish the difficult task of showing that most humans 
were not benefitting from the planetary transformations of what he calls the 
Capitalocene, while also decentering the causal story. His narrative is concep-
tually and politically radical. He exhorts us to struggle “to forge a different 
ontology of nature, humanity, and justice” in the service of “emancipation for 
all life.”41 He targets capitalism and Cartesian dualism for transformation, but 
his narrative does not allow for a narrow conception of liability for ecological 
precarity. He decenters England and the Industrial Revolution in the causal 
history and implicates colonialism, conquest, racism, sexism, and speciesism 
as contributors to ecological devastation. But I wonder whether it is intellectu-
ally or politically appropriate to describe the multifarious contributors to our 
geohistorical situation—including, if I understand his argument, all of organic 
nature—as “capital.” Of course, the rhetorical invocation of capital as a subject 
is commonplace in Marxism. Capital becomes an agent, an actor and mover 
that stands in for a complex network of causal relations. Yet, capitalism also 
becomes a “genius,” and, in the words of a critic who closely adheres to Moore’s 
analysis, “the Sixth Extinction personified.”42 Even if Moore’s story acknowl-
edges “capital and power—and countless other strategic relations,” they are 
crystallized into a single subject, and a single model of explanation.
Feminist political economist(s) J. K. Gibson-Graham warn against treating 
capitalism as a seamless, omnipotent power, a unitary force of unchallenged 
domination.43 By treating the capitalist imperative for accumulation as the ex-
planation for all earthly multispecies domination, we undermine the complex 
account of the multiple centers and forces of geohistory. While capitalism plays 
an outsized role in driving climate change and mass extinction, I worry that the 
Capitalocene account underplays, for example, motives other than accumula-
tion in genocide, slavery, and other expression of domination. If we reject the 
39. Moore, “The Rise of Cheap Nature,” 87.
40. Moore, “The Rise of Cheap Nature,” 91.
41. Moore, “The Rise of Cheap Nature,” 114.
42. McBrien, “Accumulating Extinction,” 116.
43. J. K. Gibson-Graham, The End of Capitalism (as We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of 
Political Economy (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1996).
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narrative of Anthropos as the driver of climate change for being simplistic and 
inaccurate, shouldn’t we also be suspicious of capitalism as the single expla-
nation for planetary and interspecies devastation? Even if capitalism becomes 
much more complex than in the English factory-centered model, might we be 
served by identifying competing forms of domination and emancipation that 
co-exist within capitalism? In particular, is capitalism an adequate explanation 
for social and religious conflict during “the long sixteenth century,” or for con-
quest and European expansion?
According to geographers Lewis and Maslin, contact between Europe 
and the Americas marks a watershed in the advent of geological change. Like 
Moore, they challenge the dating of the Anthropocene from the Industrial Rev-
olution and the overwhelming, if not exclusive, attention to fossil fuels among 
climate scientists. They draw on stratigraphic and other evidence to advocate a 
focus on events following the “collision between old and new worlds.”
The arrival of Europeans in the Caribbean in 1492, and subsequent annexing 
of the Americas, led to the largest human population replacement in the past 
13,000 years, the first global trade networks linking Europe, China, Africa and 
the Americas, and the resultant mixing of previously separate biotas, known 
as the Colombian Exchange.44
The unfolding of events starting in 1492 precipitated an unfathomable loss of 
human life. The Indigenous populations of the Americas declined from an es-
timate as high as 61 million to only 6 million by the mid-seventeenth century. 
The result was a near end to farming and fire-burning, with a significant impact 
on plant species and carbon levels. The collision of worlds, Lewis and Maslin 
claim, is geologically significant by virtue of both the dramatic decline in hu-
man population and the precipitation of an unprecedented homogenization 
of the earth’s biodiversity. They refer to theirs as “the Orbis Hypothesis,” Latin 
for “globe,” which sees climate change and mass extinction unfolding from the 
catastrophic collision marked by 1492.45
Their proposal, as Dana Luciano observes, effectively recognizes “genocide 
as a part of the cause of epochal division.”46 As a narrative about how we got to 
where we are and where to intervene, the implication is that white supremacy 
and colonialism are significant explanatory factors in geohistory. The source of 
44. Lewis and Maslin, “Defining the Anthropocene,” 174.
45. Lewis and Maslin, “Defining the Anthropocene,” 175. Though they find the “strati-
graphic” marker, or what geologists call “the golden spike,” in 1610.
46. Dana Luciano, “The Inhuman Anthropocene,” Los Angeles Review of Books (22 March 
2015). Accessed online 22 June 2016. http://avidly.lareviewofbooks.org/2015/03/22/the-in-
human-anthropocene/.
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our ecological problems may not be exhaustively described by capitalism, in-
dustry, or the national interests of major world powers. It is also the genocidal 
history of multiple European countries, a history that persists in the massive 
threats that climate change and resource scarcity pose to the lands of Indig-
enous peoples. The “Orbis hypothesis” highlights the ongoing importance of 
Indigenous sovereignty and the planetary implications of human and nonhu-
man extinction.
Taken together, the Capitalocene proposal and the Orbis hypothesis pose 
radical challenges to the Anthropocene narrative. They recognize climate 
change, mass extinction, and a whole constellation of planetary changes as 
anthropogenic without extinguishing the radical differences in power among 
humankind. They likewise enable us to grasp the sources of devastation as sys-
tematic, as a complex interaction among various forces, with diverse origins 
and trajectories. Thinking and acting in the face of genuinely global, plane-
tary problems, with deep historical, biological, and chemical roots, is a task for 
which we do not yet have the concepts and tools. There is a temptation, as a 
result, to over-simplify the narrative.47 Radical critics rightly object to the sim-
plicity of the Anthropocene narrative for treating humanity as a natural kind, 
a single actor, whose members bear equal causal and moral responsibility. Yet, 
radical critics are also tempted to unify the narrative, to identify their preferred 
villains, to isolate a single system or constellation of causes. Certainly we have 
to pick our battles, target problems to address, and find language that generates 
solidarity and hope. This will always involve contestable exercises in naming 
and narrative. My goal is only to warn against the dangers involved in narrowly 
isolating culpable agents or reducing all forms of planetary injustice to a single 
process (capitalism). We ought to avoid both reductivism and moralization.
Why should we be concerned with moralization? Isn’t it the case that the 
project of naming our geological epoch has profound moral implications? The 
project of radical critique involves marking differences in power, profound sus-
picion towards invocations of universal “man,” and wariness with respect to 
an uncritical idiom of nature.48 These are also traditions wary of reductionism 
and vilification. Pointing to a tiny sliver of humanity (and its heirs), a par-
ticular nation (or narrow set of them), or a narrow set of industries isolates 
moral responsibility, but it also constrains causal analysis. Isolating culpability 
is necessary for a liability analysis aimed at extracting reparations, but it may 
47. Any narrative, of course, will involve simplification. It is impossible to tell a story, espe-
cially one that takes place over hundreds of years, that features every significant actor. 
48. I advocate a critical idiom of nature inspired by Elizabeth Grosz and Benedict de 
Spinoza in my book, Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011).
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detract from a systemic analysis targeting radical transformation.49 While I do 
not doubt that there are bad guys who deserve to pay, I hope we want more 
than just compensation (and I do not deny it would be just). I hope we also 
want a collective movement to live differently. The task for radical critics in 
a time of ecological crisis, I suggest in this essay, is indeed to mark decisive 
differences in power, but in order to promote a broad-based solidarity move-
ment toward radical change. In excess of the intentions of radical critics of the 
Anthropocene, the moralistic moments of their critiques—precisely because 
they resound so strongly and movingly among students, for example—lend 
those critiques to juridical reasoning whose logic supports appeals to “the one 
percent,” to dirty energy, or to rich nations to do the right thing. Radical criti-
cism reads history as a struggle between powers and counter-powers. Among 
other critical lenses, the radical critic may emphasize ecological precarity as an 
outcome of class struggle, bloody campaigns of Empire, impositions of brutal 
institutions of slavery and oppression, and multifarious modes of domination 
of women, gender non-conforming people, and nonhuman animals. These are 
complex structural analyses that ought not lend themselves easily to a narra-
tive of a few poisoned Anthropoi. Likewise, radical criticism is premised on the 
appreciation that our moral claims will not induce the powerful to act against 
what they perceive to be their own interests. Let us be wary of how the retort 
“not all humans” can be reduced to an isolated accusation against perpetrators 
of evil rather than a comprehensive call to fight against the ongoing annihila-
tion of our interspecies commons.
49. Iris Young offers a compelling criticism of the “liability model of justice” in Responsibil-
ity for Justice, which has influenced my account here.
